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THE IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE ELECTRIC RATE STRUCTURES FOR IRRIGATION 
CAM-WAL REC 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this research report, the impacts 
rate structures for irrigation for the 
(REC) are evaluated. Consideration is 
different forms of electric rate charges. 
of alternative electric rates and 
Cam-Wal Rural Electric Cooperative 
given · to both different levels and 
The alternative electric rate structures are evaluated in terms of the 
behavior of managers of hypothetical farms designed to represent two types of 
"typical" irrigator clients served by the REC: "low-lands" irrigators with 
150 feet of water lift and "bluffs" irrigators with 300 feet of water lift. 
A linear programming model was developed to portray as fully as possible the 
technical, institutional, and economic features associated with the repre-
sentative farms. 
The managers of the representative farms are assumed to be able to make 
short-term farm enterprise and irrigation adjustments--as well as long-term 
changes in the numbers of and energy sources for their irrigation systems--in 
response to pre-season declared changes in electric rate structures for ir-
rigation by the Cam-Wal. REC electric . power supplier. The specific types of 
irrigation adjustments considered are the use or non-use of two existing 
electric power center pivots, the conversion of the existing center pivots to 
diesel power, and the purchase of new electric or diesel powered irrigation 
systems for use on dryland. 
The reference point in the linear programming analysis of the represent-
ative farms is the 1985 Cam-Wal REC electric rate structure for irrigation. 
The rate structure involves (1) a aonthly ainiaua charge of $2.20 per 
nameplate horsepower during any of five monthly billing periods during the 
irrigation season when an irrigation system (pump) is not operated: (2) a 
aonthly deaand charge of $8.70 per kilowatt (kW) used per month, during 
each monthly billing period when an irrigation system (pump) is operated: and 
(3) a thre~step energy charge involving 4.2 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) 
for the first 100 kWh per kW per month, 3.7 cents per kWh for the next 200 
kWh per kW per month,· and 2.2 · cents per kWh for all additional kWhs used. 
The study's "baseline solutions" involve the modeling of each represent-
ative farm with the Cam-Wal REC actual electric rate structure for 1985 under 
two different types of situations. The first, involving irrigators with 
debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment, is undertaken to 
determine the impacts of financial leveraging on irrigator behavior. The 
second, involving 1985 government grain commodity program, 1985 free market, 
or 1980 free market crop prices, is undertaken to determine the impacts of 
government program participation and different commodity price levels on ir-
rigator behavior. Attention is given to expected electric power revenues 
received by the REC and levels of farm income earned by irrigators with nor-
mal precipitation, as well as the estimated range in year-to-year revenue/in-
come associated with unusually heavy and light precipitation. 
A series of electric rates and rate structures differing from those in 
1985 is examined through linear programming analysis as follows: (1) 
electric energy (kWh) charges both lesser and greater than those assessed in 
1985. which e~bles the estimation of derived demand functions for electric 
power to pump irrigation water. (2) greater and lesser "fixed" up-front 
monthly minimum and monthly demand and variable energy (kWh) charges. and (3) 
differently configured energy (kWh) block rates. namely. single-step. 
modified three-step declining. and three-step increasing block rates. 
Major finding• 
1. In 10 of the 12 baseline solutions for the low-lands and bluffs 
representative farms. irrigated crop production is profitable. The irriga-
tion systems. numbering up to six per farm and each involving corn produc-
tion. are all electrically powered (i.e •• diesel systems are not part of the 
baseline solutions). The enterprises common to all 12 baseline solutions are 
beef production (ranging from 42 to 125 beef brood cows and associated win-
tering calves). corn grain (130 - 780 acres). alfalfa (54 - 162 acres). oats 
(10 31 acres). and corn silage (4 - 12 acres). The last three crops are 
grown exclusively as livestock feed. In addition. either spring wheat (80 -
525 acres) or barley (462 767 acres) is grown as a cash crop in each 
solution. 
2. The impacts of 150 feet of additional puaping lift on the bluffs 
fara on the profitability of using already-present center pivot units 
and/or in investing in new irrigation systems are very considerable. For ex-
ample. from one to six (including four newly purchased) center pivot systems 
can be profitably operated in the different low-lands farm baseline solu-
tions. For the bluffs farm. on the other hand. one existing center pivot 
system is· left idle in all six optimal (most profitable) baseline farm plans. 
and the other existing center pivot system is operated in only four of the 
six baseline solutions. Even so. in five of the six comparable baseline 
farming situations. the total annual payments for irrigation pumping energy 
are more on the bluffs farm than on the low-lands farm. The differences 
range from $4.400 to $25.900 per irrigator. This outcome reflects the 3.5 
times greater energy requirement per acre-foot of water pumped associated 
with the 150 feet greater water lift on the bluffs farm. 
The returns to operator labor and management on the bluffs farm are from 
$37.000 to over $50.000 less than for comparable baseline situations for the 
low-lands farm. These profit differentials arise primarily from (1) the 
$24.000 greater annual cost associated with the two existing center pivots on 
the bluffs farm and (2) a combination of the higher operating costs for the 
one center pivot that is used in some of the bluffs farm solutions and the 
need for the bluffs irrigators to pay monthly minimum charges on one or two 
idled center pivots. while being unable to reap the benefits of irrigated 
(versus dryland) production that their low-lands counterparts do. 
Diesel systems are not profitable in any of the bluffs farm models ex-
amined. With higher electricity prices for the derived demand functions es-
timated for the low-lands farm. however. diesel systems replace part of the 
otherwise more profitable electric systems. 
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3. The solutions for irrigators who finance newly purchased irriga-
tion equipaeat with debt-capital rather than lower 8llllualised cost 
equi~capital sometimes differ--especially for the low-lands farm. Except 
for some tend~ncy for more extensive irrigation by equity-financing ir-
rigators. however. common patterns do not characterize the differences. 
4. The impacts of faraers participating in the 1985 governaent grain 
comaodity prograa on the economics of irrigation and the overall 
profitability of farming are considerable. The baseline study results show 
that in 1985 government program participants. in contrast with non-
participants. (a) on the bluffs could afford to operate one rather than 
neither existing center pivot system. (b) on the low-lands with debt-
financing could afford to operate both rather than only one of their existing 
center pivot systems. and (c) on the low-lands with equity-financing could 
afford to purchase four rather than no new irrigation systems. By par-
ticipating in the government program. losses from farming are reduced between 
$8.400 and $25.300. 
5. The short-term impacts of unusual precipitation on the Cam-Wal REC 
are expectedly the opposite of those on irrigators. With the baseline solu-
tions. for example. unusually heavy precipitation results in a $830 to $2.500 
reduction (8% to 10%) in REC electric power revenue per irrigator but a 
$12.600 to $37.200 increase in irrigator profits. With unusually light 
precipitation, on the other band, REC electric power revenues per irrigator 
are $680 to $2,000 more, and irrigator profits are $13,500 to $47.500 less. 
These outcomes arise primarily because of a much greater impact of unusual 
precipitation on irrigators' dryland crop yields and income than on their ir-
rigation electric power payments. 
6. Results of the analysis on derived deaand functions for electric 
power to energize irrigation pumps show that: 
Low-lands 
electric energy use 
cents per kWh from. the 
electric power to pump 
debt-financing irrigators would begin to cut back on 
if electricity prices were to rise between 10 and 13 
1985 rate, and that they would totally shift away from 
irrigation water at 18 cents per kWh electricity: 
Low-lands equity-financing irrigators would totally stop using 
electric power for pumping at 8 cents per kWh: and 
Bluffs irrigators not participating in the government grain com-
modity program would find it profitable to operate one of their two existing 
center pivots if the average energy charge were to drop to 3 cents per kWh. 
but even with a price as low as 1 cent per kWh they would not find- it 
profitable to operate their second existing center pivot unit. 
7. The •fixed• cost electric power coaponenta (the monthly minimlDll 
and monthly demand charges) comprise between 68% and 75% of the total 
electricity costs for pumping irrigation water in the baseline solutions. 
Because of the need for an REC's capital assets to eventually be replaced, 
the relative importance of "fixed" costs does not generally diminish over 
time. 
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8. A one-at-a-time doubling of the individual aonthly aini.aua.. 
aonthly deaand. and energy electric rate charges results in either no 
change or a decrease in irrigation pumping and electric power usage. REC 
irrigation power revenues thereby increase in some instances, but decrease in 
just as many cases. The annual decreases in irrigator profits, from the 
doubled electric rate charges, relative to the respective baseline values, 
range from $1,000 to $10,000 for the low-lands farm and from $5,500 to $6,500 
for the bluffs farm. 
9. A one-at-a-time 75% reduction in the individual electric rate 
charges results in either no change or an increase in irrigation pumping 
and electric power usage. REC irrigation power revenues either remain the 
same, or more often decrease (by as much as 57%). Irrigator profits increase 
with the reduced electric rate charges roughly to the same extent that they 
are reduced with the respective increased charges. 
10. The single-step. more steeply graduated three-step declining. and 
three-step · increasing energy (kWh) block rates examined have no effect on 
irrigation electric power and water usage in a majority of the circumstances 
examined. This includes all instances in which the 1985 "fixed" up-front 
electric rate components are retained in the rate structure. - When the 
"fixed" up-front electric rate components are set at zero on the bluffs farm, 
however, the modified energy (kWh) block rates do induce changes in energy 
and water use. But the directions of impact are sometimes contrary to that 
expected. 
Implications of findings to electric rate pricing policies 
These findings have at least three direct implications to electric rate 
pricing policies. 
1. The technical (e.g., feet of water lift), institutional (e.g., 
whether government grain commodity participants), and economic (e.g., whether 
debt- or equity-capital is used to finance the purchase of new irrigation 
equipment) circumstances facing different irrigators in the Cam-Wal REC ser-
vice area strongly influence irrigator demand for electric power - to energize 
irrigation pumps. For some farmers, the 1985 average energy cost of 3.8 to 
3.9 cents per kWh was high enough to make the use of even existing irrigation 
systems unprofitable. For others, the electric energy cost could increase up 
to 8 cents per kWh before they would totally shift away from electric power 
to energize their irrigation pumps. For still others, the increase could be 
up to as much as 18 cents per kWh. 
These findings show that any changes made by the Cam-Wal REC in electric 
energy (kWh) rates are likely to impact the quantity of electric power that 
will be purchased collectively by irrigators in the Cam-Wal REC service area. 
The findings also suggest that, with diesel fuel at $0.97 per gallon and even 
at considerably higher electrical energy (kWh) prices, some irrigators would 
likely remain as REC customers. 
2. The short-run implications of unusual precipitation on REC revenues 
are expectedly the opposite of those on irrigator profits. If the negative 
impacts on irrigators from drought are great enough to force the irrigators 
out of business, however, both the irrigators and their "parent" RECs stand 
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to lose. Thus. a rate structure that provides for 
between RECs and irrigators of unusual precipitation can 
the best long-term economic interests of both irrigators 
the sharing of risks 
be expected to be in 
and RECs. 
Two features of the current Cam-Wal REC electric rate structure for ir-
rigation provide for the sharing of risks between irrigators and RECs during 
seasons of unusual pumping. The spreading of the "fixed" up-front costs aver 
fewer kWhs results in higher average costs per kWh in years of unusually 
limited · irrigation pumping. The three-stepped declining energy (kWh) block 
rate also results in higher average variable energy (kWh) costs with limited 
pumping. Conversely. when pumping during an irrigation season is unusually 
great. both features contribute to a below normal overall average cost per 
kWh for the electric power used by an irrigator. 
3. The findings from this case study provide only limited support for 
the possibility of structural changes in electric pricing policies being used 
to effect desired changes in electric power use by irrigators. 
For 27% of the hypothesized relationships. modified rate structures 
provide inducement for irrigators to make expected changes in electric power 
use to energize irrigation pumps. In 5% of the cases. changes contrary to 
expectations are induced. In the vast majority of cases (68%). irrigators 
show no response to the structural changes in electricity prices examined. 
Thus. the study results show one positive and one negative finding on 
the use of structural changes in electric pricing policies for electricity 
use in irrigation. On the one hand. electric rate structure pricing policies 
can be used to impact effectively the sharing of revenue/income risks as-
sociated with unusually great or little irrigation pumping between irrigators 
and their parent RECs. On the other hand. the prospects of being able to ef-
fectively use policies for structural changes in electric rate structures 
to provide incentives for greater or lesser electric energy use by irrigators 
appear to be very limited. Changes in the level of electric energy charg-
es. however. can definitely be expected to impact electric power use by ir-
rigators. 
5 
INTRO DU CT ION 
This is the fifth in a first-round series of five Economics Department 
reports on a research project, "The Economic Impact of Alternative Electric 
Rate Structures on Energy and Water Use", sponsored by the South Dakota 
Agricultural Experiment Station. Supplemental funding for the research was 
provided by the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), Golden, Colorado. 
The purpose of this report is to present the empirical results from the 
study · of different electric rates and rate structures for irrigation for the 
Cam-Wal Rural Electric Cooperative (REC) in north central South Dakota. As a 
prelode to the presentation of results, abbreviated descriptions ·of the over-
all irrigation electric rate structure research project and the Cam-Wal REC 
representative farm models used in the research are provided. 
The initially presented results--termed the "baseline solutions"--
involve the modeling of the representative farms with the actual electric 
rate structure for irrigation used in 1985 by the Cam-Wal REC. The next 
group of results shows the impacts of variable energy [kilowatt hour = kWh] 
charges that are both lower and higher than those assessed in 1985 on the 
prospective demands for electric power and water for irrigation. The results 
for two types of alternative rate structure analysis are then · presented. 
These involve greater and lesser "fixed" up-front and variable energy charges 
and differently configured energy - (kWh) -block rates. .The impacts of unusual-
ly heavy and light precipitation· on REC power sales and revenues and ir-
rigator prof its are also covered. 
The other reports in this research report series are as follows: 
- No. 1, Enterprise Budgets and Other Data-Sets; Electric Rate 
Structure-Irrigation Study; Clay-Union, Union, Cherry-Todd, 
and Cam-Wal RECs; 
- No. 2, Mixed Integer Linear Programming Model: Electric Rate 
Structure-Irrigation Study; Clay-Union, Union, Cherry-Todd, 
and Cam-Wal RECs: 
- No. 3, The Impacts of Alternative Electric Rate Structures for 
Irrigation, Clay-Union and Union RECs; antl 
- No. 4, The Impacts of Alternative Electric Rate Structures for 
Irrigation, Cherry-Todd REC. 
A casual reader can expect to find this report to stand on its own. Readers 
with a more serious interest in the empirical findings in this report, 
however, will find it helpful to consult Reports 1 and 2 for detailed infor-
mation on the data-sets and modeling used in the study. Where linkages be-
tween this and the other reports are particularly strong, refe'rences are made 
parenthetically to pertinent sections from the prior reports. 
About 80% 
electricity. · The 
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
of South Dakota's irrigation pumps are energized by 
high cost · and under-utilization of recently developed, 
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coal-based electric power generation facilities have resulted in increased 
wholesale costs of electric power and, in turn, in higher electric rates for 
irrigators and other electric power consumers. Operating within an already 
financially-stressed agriculture, RECs that supply electricity to irrigators 
are exploring possible revisions to rate structures for the mutual benefit of 
the RECs and their members. 
The research results reported in this publication show the impacts of 
alternative electric rates and rate structures on (1) the demands for power 
to energize irrigation pumps and for irrigation water and (2) expected levels 
of irrigator farm income and REC electric power revenue. Special analytic 
attention is given to different levels of commodity prices, debt- versus 
equity-financed irrigation equipment, and both average income/revenue levels 
and the estimated range in year-to-year income/revenue associated with un-
usually heavy and light precipitation. 
What represents a "most appropriate" irrigation electric rate structure 
for one REC may not ·be most appropriate for another. A host of rather 
location-specific factors determines what is most appropriate. These factors 
include (1) average amounts of and year-to-year variations in precipitation 
and solar radiation (as these impact amounts of irrigation water that must be 
pumped), (2) the lift and source of pumped water, (3) the nature of soils and 
topography, (4) the spectrum of potentially profitable farm enterprises, (5) 
the internal financial structure of an REC, (6) the importance of irrigation 
relative to other sectors in an REC's power sales, and (7) the philosophic 
positions of an REC's manager and governing board. Taking into account the 
first four factors, study sites in four different South Dakota RECs were 
selected for separate study and analysis. In selecting the RECs and study 
sites within their respective service areas, efforts were made to cover as 
wide a range as possible of conditions for each of the four factors. 
The study sites for the four selected RECs and a brief description of 
their attributes, relative to the four selection criteria, are as follows 
(for more details, see pp 3-6 and Figures 1 and 2 in Report 1): 
Cam-Wal REC, irrigated area south of Mobridge and just east of the 
Missouri River in Walworth County, 
*Precipitation--lowest of the study sites, 
*Pump lift from the Missouri River--about 150 ft for the "low-lands" 
research site and 300 ft for the "bluffs" research site, 
*Soils- -generally heavy, with an undulating topography, which 
preclodes "low pressure" water distribution, and 
*Farm enterprises--cow-calf 
for any study site, including 
forages (corn silage, sorghum sudan 
operations and the widest range of crops 
corn, alfalfa, small grains, and annual 
pasture); 
Clay-Union REC, irrigated area east of Vermillion and south of Route 
50 in Clay County, 
*Precipitation--relatively high and stable from year to year, 
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*Pump lift--shallow ground water (about 25 ft of lift is common). 
*Soils--light and low-lying. and 
*Farm enterprises--mainly corn and soybeans. but some hog 
farrowing-finishing. small grains. and alfalfa as well; 
- Union REC. irrigated area primarily east of Elk Point and just west of 
the Big Sioux River. but also extending along the north side of Route 29 
north of Eik Point to Route 50. 
*Precipitation and pump lift--similar to the Clay-Union REC. 
*Soils--heavy. with some areas having sufficiently flat topography to 
permit· gated pipe irrigation. and 
Farm enterprises--similar to the Clay-Union REC. except for fewer 
hog enterprises and more limited alfalfa production; and 
Cherry-Todd REC. irrigated area south of a line roughly between St. 
Francis and Olsonville to the southern border in Todd County. 
*Precipitation--limited. 
*Pump lift--deep ground water (about 130 ft of lift is common). 
*Soils--light. sandy. well-drained to excessively drained. and 
*Farm enterprises--somewhat narrow range. with cow-calf en-
terprises. corn. alfalfa. and oats being most common. 
In this report. the results from the study for the Cam-Wal REC are 
presented. In Reports 3 and 4. the results for the Clay-Union. · Union9 and 
Cherry-Todd RECs are presented. Subsequent publications · will cover more 
generalized findings based on the· results for all four RECs. In those 
publications. the overall implications of the study's findings for the four 
RECs to the formulation of electric rate pricing policies for irrigation will 
be stressed. 
REPRESENTATIVE FARM MODEL ANALYSIS 
To accomplish the purpose of the research. two hypothetical farms were 
identified to represent "typical" irrigator clients served by the REC: a 
"low-lands" farm with 150 · feet of ·water lift from the Missouri River and a 
'-'bluffs" farm with 300 feet of water lift. The added pumping energy require-
ment associated with the grea~er water lift · on the bluffs farm implies well 
over twice the investment in irrigation equipment and over 3.5 times the 
energy for pumping water (see p 17 and Tables 17 and 18 in Report 2). 
Otherwise. the nature of the two representative farms is identical. A linear 
programming model was developed to portray as fully as possible the techni-
cal. institutional. and economic features associated with the representative 
farms (for a detailed description of the model. see Report 2). 
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Nature and role of representative f aras in the research 
The representative farm models are intended to reflect conditions on 
typical irrigated farms with above-average management in the Cam-Wal REC ser-
vice area in 1985. Irrigator farm managers are assumed to be able to make 
short-term farm ·enterprise and irrigation adjustments in response to pre-
season declared changes in electric rates and rate structures for irrigation 
by their REC electric power supplier. They are also assumed to be able to 
make changes in irrigation technology · (namely. shifting from electric to 
diesel power sources and/or purchasing new irrigation systems) which have 
long-term implications to farm resource use. Thus. while the models involve 
only a single production period. a longer term (7 to 15 years) decision-
making planning horizon is envisioned for the managers of the representative 
farms. 
The representative farms are assumed to already be in operation. They 
have 260. 490. and 750 acres of irrigated cropland. non-irrigated cropland. 
and rangeland. respectively. and generally adequate machinery and equipment. 
farm buildings. and a breeding herd to make economic use of the land. The 
available machinery and equipment includes two electric power. high pressure 
center pivot systems (for more details on the assumed availability of resour-
ces and the constraints on resource use for the representative farms. see pp 
19-20 and Tables 26 and 26 in Report 1 and pp 7-8 in Report 2). 
Electric rate structures exaained 
In 1985. the electric rate structure for irrigation for the Cam-Wal REC 
contained provisions for monthly minimum. monthly demand. and three-step 
declining block rate charges. The specific provisions of the rate structure 
are as follows: 
Monthly minimum charge: $2.20 
for each of the five monthly billing 
rigation pump) is not used; 
per nameplate horsepower (HP) payable 
periods when an irrigation system (ir-
Monthly demand charge: $8.70 per kW used per month. during each 
monthly billing period when an irrigation system (pump) is operated; 
- Energy charges: 
* First-step. 4.2 cents per kWh for the first 100 kWh per kW per 
month; 
* Second-step. 3.7 cents per kWh for the next 200 kWh per kW per 
month; and 
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*Third-step, 2.2 cents per kWh for all additional kWh. 1 
This is the "baseline" electric rate structure used in the study. A 
series of electric rates and -rate structures differing from that in 1985 was 
also examined, as follows: 
Estimated demand for electric power to pump irrigtion water, with 
per kWh charges both higher and lower than those assessed in 1985: 
Higher and lower "fixed" up-front (monthly minimum and monthly 
demand) and variable energy electric rate charges: and 
Differently configured block rates, namely, single step, modified 
three-step declining, and three-step increasing energy (kWh) block rates. 
Using the linear programming model, optimal (most profitable) solutions 
for the representative farms with the 1985 electric rate structures were 
first determined. The results of this analysis show the most profitable farm 
enterprises, irrigation technologies, and amounts of electric power use and 
electric power revenue for irrigation pumping, and the return to operator 
labor and management for each representative farm situation. Most profitable 
farm plans were then determined for each of these electric rate and rate 
structure alternatives. The conclusions of the study are based on a com-
parison of the farm organization, energy use, electric power revenue, and ir-
rigated farm profit features of these various plans. 
Irrigation alternatives considered 
Several options are open to irrigators in responding to different 
electric rates and rate structures. In the study of electric rate structures 
for irrigation for the Cam-Wal REC, three irrigation alternatives were con-
sidered. The alternatives and the underlying rationale for including each in 
the study are as follows (for added detail covering these alternatives, see 
pp 14-16 and Tables 17 and 19 of Report 1 and pp 8-11 of Report 2). 
The use or non-use of two existing. electric paver. high pressure [a 
pivot · pressure of about 75 pounds per square inch] center pivots. An im-
portant practical question is whether energy prices are so high (relative to 
commodity price levels) that farmers should no longer use irrigation systems 
already present on their farms. Thus, one objective of the analysis is to 
determine how high electric power rates can rise before it becomes uneconomic 
to use existing electrically powered pumps to lift and distribute irrigation 
1The two suppliers of electric power to the Rushmore Electric Power 
Cooperative--which in turn supplies electric power to the Cam-Wal REC--are 
the Western Area Power Authority (WAPA) and the Basin Electric-Power 
Cooperative. · During 1985 and 1986; Basin Electric granted a 2 cents per kWh 
credit on all electric power used for irrigation. This credit was passed -
"down the line" to irrigators. The impact of the Basin credit on irrigators 
served by the Rushmore Electric Power Cooperative is 1.3 cents per kWh: the 
energy charges shown in the text take into account this Basin credit; The 
irrigator credit is less than 2 cents per kWh because some of the electric 
power supplied to Rushmore is from WAPA. 
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. . . 2 irrigation water. 
Conversion of existing center pivots to diesel power 
In response to rising electric power rates. irrigators may find it 
economic to convert their existing electrically powered irrigation systems to 
diesel power. The economic question is whether prospective energy cost 
savings from diesel power will more than offset the annualized costs of con-
verting existing equipment from electric to diesel energy sources. The rep-
resentative farm analysis is structured so as to enable a determination of 
how high electric rates can rise before it becomes economic for irrigators to 
substitute diesel ~uel for electricity to energize irrigation pumps. 
The purchase of new irrigation systeas. A further practical question 
is whether irrigators can economically convert more land to irrigation. 
Provision is made in the model for the purchase of either electric or diesel 
powered new center pivot systems for use on dryland. Provision is also made 
for renting up to 300 acres of additional dryland at $20 per acre. 
Financing the purchase of new irrigation equipaent with debt- versus 
1!quity-capital 
Irrigation systems represent multi-period inputs. In economic analysis. 
the investments required for purchasing them need to be spread out (i.e •• 
amortized) over . a nmnber of years. Two types of amortization can be 
undertaken. 
A "financial" type of amortization pertains to debt-financed purchases. 
The most commonly reported method for debt-financed irrigation system pur-
·chases in South Dakota is via a lease-purchase program involving an initial 
downpayment· of 15;5%. six annual payments of 15.7% each. and a terminal "buy-
out" payment of 10% of the purchase price. The debt repayment for converting 
electric power systems to diesel power is commonly amortized over four years. 
while the smaller investments for converting from high to low pressure water 
distribution are commonly amortized over two years. 
An "economic" type of amortization reflects a longer-term. equity-
capital (i.e •• farmer-owned capital or savings). economic-profit perspective 
in which no attention is paid to debt repayment terms. The number of years 
and interest rate used in this type of amortization reflect a long-term op-
portuni ty cost investment perspective of the decision-maker. In this study. 
the "economic" amortization of investment costs was assumed to extend over 15 
years. 
The annualized "financial" costs of investing in new irrigation systems 
in the Cam-Wal REC service area are 1.3 times higher than the corresponding 
annualized Meconomic" costs (for more detail. see pp 15-16 and Table 17 in 
2unless the existing electrically powered center pivot systems are 
converted to diesel power (see the next para). the model requires the 
payment of the monthly minimum charges no matter whether the systems are 
used or not. 
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Report 1).3 This outcome arises primarily because of a shorter amortization 
period (7 versus 15 years), and also because of the somewhat higher interest 
rate implicit in the lease-purchase terms. These cost differences imply that 
the most rational behavior of irrigators who purchase new irrigation equip-
ment with equity-capital may be different from that for irrigators who have 
to meet the schedule of debt-repayments associated with recently or newly 
purchased irrigation equipment financed by debt-capital. 
ec-moclity price assU11ptions 
The farm enterprise budgets used in analysis were developed using 1985 
input · prices, insurance rates, custom rates, wage rates, and capital costs. 
In most of the alternative electric rate and rate structure scenarios, it was 
assumed that the representative farm managers participated in the 1985 
government price support program and therefore received full price support 
payments. The government grain commodity program prices used in the repre-
sentative farm analysis reflect the 1985 seasonal average "free market" 
prices--as reported by the South Dakota Agricultural Statistical Service and 
the U.S. ~epartment of Agriculture--plus the government deficiency payments 
(Table 1). 
To obtain some idea of the impact of different levels of commodity 
prices, in part of the analysis 1985 government program non-participant free 
market and 1980 free mar~et crop prices were also used. The 1985 free market 
prices are 17% less (corn grain) to 24% less (spring wheat) than the govern-
ment program crop prices. The 1980 free market prices, in "real" (inflation-
adjusted) 1985 terms, range · from 12% less (spring wheat) to -22% more (barley) 
than the government program crop prices. 
Gross profit 118Xiaization 
Solving the linear program representative farm models involved selecting 
the ~ombination of crop and livestock production enterprises and irrigation 
technologies that would maximize the farm's "gross profit", where "gross 
profit" is defined as the difference between gross revenue and the variable 
costs -of farm production. The variable costs of farm production are those 
which could be avoided if production were to be stopped. These include out-
of-pocket production costs (e.g., for fertilizer, tractor fuel, land rent) 
and the annualized costs of newly purchased irrigation equipment. 
3The annualized "financial" ownership costs represent the present value of 
the series of payments to -meet the terms of the lease-purchase agreement--
expressed on an annual basis. The annualized "economic" ownership costs 
represent the present value of a series of payments amortized over 15 years 
at 11% interest to offset the purchase price of irrigation systems. The 
payment factors for the annualized "economic" and "financial" ownership 
costs are 0.14 and 0.21, respectively. 
4To avail of the government deficiency payments in 1985, farmers were 
required to set-aside 30% of their base wheat acreage and 10% of their base 
corn, oats, and barley acreages. Adjustments to the total owned and rented 
acreages, consistent with these set-aside requirements, were made in the 
process of determining the optimal solution for each model run. A cost of 
$15 per acre was assumed for controlling weed growth on the set-aside area. 
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Table 1. Farm gate 1985 government program. 1985 free market. and 1980 free market 
crop prices; Cam-Wal REC service area. 
)985 free market 2rices 1980 free market 2rices 
As a ratio As a ratio 
1985 to the 1985 to the 1985 
government government government 
program program In 1985 program 
Crop Unit prices ($) Dollars prices dollars prices 
Spring wheat bu 4.58 3.50 0.76 4.05 0.88 
Corn grain bu 2.84 2.36 0.83 2.93 1.03 
Oats bu 1.56 1.27 0.81 1.68 1.08 
Barley bu 2.34 1.82 0 .78 2.85 1.22 
Alfalfa ton n/a 45.00 n/a 48.00 n/a 
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The gross profits determined in the computer-based optimal solutions 
were · adjusted to cover the annual costs of (1) the existing resources on the 
farm and (2) the weed control on set-aside areas. The annualized costs as-
sociated with the existing land, farm machinery and equipment, and livestock-
related resources for the Cam-Wal REC low-lands and bluffs representative 
farms are $79,000 and $103,060, respectively. These costs differ by the 
$24,000 difference in the annualized costs for owning two center pivot sys-
tems on the bluffs farm compared to the low-lands farm (see p 20 and Table 26 
of Report 1 and pp 6 and 7 of Report 2 for added detail). As indicated in 
the prior footnote, a charge of $15 per acre was assumed for controlling weed 
growth on the set-aside area. The resulting "net profit" thereby calculated 
for each model run represents the return · to the irrigator's labor and 
management. 
Unusual precipitation 
In years of unusually heavy precipitation, farmers pump less irrigation 
water. Other things the same, this impacts REC irrigation revenues negative-
ly. and irrigator profits positively. In years of unusually light precipita-
tion, the implications are the converse. Examining the impacts on REC 
revenues and irrigator profits of unusually heavy and light precipitation is. 
therefore, one analytic focal point in the study. 
The mean May-September precipitation level over the past 31 years at the 
Mobridge weather station--which serves as the precipitation reference point 
for the Cam-Wal REC service area--is 11.2 inches. To determine pertinent 
levels of unnsually heavy and unusually light precipitation to use in 
analysis, the yearly May-September precipitation amounts were arrayed from 
smallest to largest. "Unusually heavy precipitation" was defined to 
represent an amount exceeded in no more than one to three years out of the 
30-34 years for which data were available for each of the four REC service 
areas. 5 An analogous procedure was followed to determine the "unusually 
light precipitation" level. Resulting from the application of this general 
procedure was the -identification of 17.4 and 6.7 inches to represent 
May-September unusually heavy and light precipitation, respectively. for the 
Cam-Wal REC service area. 
It was assumed in analysis that representative farm managers had already 
made their farm organizational plans and planted their crops based on normal-
ly expected precipitation. Selected most profitable solutions for the repre-
sentative farms which were· based on normally expected precipitation, thus, 
became the reference point for examining the impacts of unusually heavy and 
light precipitation. The examination was via partial budgeting. with joint 
attention to: 
The reduced (increased) irrigation system (a) pumping and (b) repair 
and maintenance costs resulting from reduced (increased) irrigation water 
application rates; 
5The years of available precipitation data for the different reference 
point weather stations in the study range from 30 to 34. The unusually 
heavy and light precipitation levels were determined in relation to natural 
break-points among the one to three years of both heaviest and lightest 
annual precipitation. 
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The increased (reduced) dryland crop yields; and 
The increased (reduced) costs of drying and storing the increased 
(reduced) dryland crop production output associated with unusually heavy 
(light) precipitation (see pp 13-14 and Tables 11 and 12 in Report 1 for 
added detail). 
BASELINE SOLUTIONS 
The baseline solutions involve the modeling of the representative farms 
with · the actual electric rate structure for irrigation used by the Cam-Wal 
REC in 1985. Both the low-lands and bluffs farms were examined under the 
following conditions: either debt- or equity-financed new irrigation equip-
ment and either participants or non-participants in the 1985 farm program or 
with 1980 free market farm crop prices. An overview of the results for the 
12 baseline solutions is first presented. Attention is then given to con-
trasting results. in turn. for the low-lands versus bluffs representative 
farms. irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment. 
and irrigators faced with different farm crop price situations. 
Overview of results 
In 10 of the 12 baseline solutions for the two representative farms 
(Tables 2 . and 3). irrigated crop production is profitable. The irrigation 
systems. numbering up to six per farm. are all electrically powered (i.e •• 
diesel systems are not part of the baseline solutions). The irrigator pay-
ments for irrigation pumping energy (which. in turn. · become irrigation 
revenues to the REC) range from about $4.400 to $25.900 per irrigator per 
season. 
The maximum of 300 acres of dryland is rented in all 12 baseline solu-
tions~ The crops common to all 12 solutions are corn grain (ranging from 130 
acres to · 780 acres per farm). alfalfa (54 - 162 acres). oats (10 - 31 acres). 
and corn silage (4 - 12 acres). The last three crops are grown exclusively 
as livestock feed. Either spring wheat (80 - 525 acres) or barley (642 - 767 
acres) is grown as a cash crop in each solution. In those solutions involv-
ing 125 beef brood cows and associated wintering calves. 62 acres of sorghum-
sudan pasture are also grown. In 8 of the 12 most profitable solutions. 
however. herds of onLy 42 or 94 beef brood cows can be economically main-
tained on the farms. Herd size differences arise because of differences. in 
various solutions. in the competitiveness of wheat and barley relative to 
livestock forages. 
The returns to operator labor and management from farming in 9 of the 12 
solutions are strongly negative (ranging from about - $13.200 to -$63.400). 
The only baseline solutions not involving losses are for the low-lands-· farm 
with 1980 free market crop prices in which the return for the operator's 
labor and management is roughly $20.000. 
LOll"""lands versus bluffs farms 
The optimal solutions for the low-lands farm differ greatly from those 
for the bluffs farm. From one to six center pivot systems can be profitably 
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Table 2. Baseline solutions: irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment: 1985 government 
program. 1985 free market. and 1980 free market crop prices; Cam- Wal low-lands representative farm. 
Resource acquisition 
New center pivot systems purchased 
Dryland rented (acres) 
Irrigated production (acres) 
Corn grain 
Dryland production (acres) 
Spring wheat 
Corn grain 
Oats 
Barley 
....,. Alfalfa 
"' 
Corn silage 
Sorghum-sudan pasture 
Total 
Cow-calf beef production and associated 
calf wintering (brood cows) 
Electric power used for irrigation 
Total cost ($) 
Total kWh 
Average cost per kWh (cents) 
Irrigation water used (acre-feet) 
Return to operator labor and 
management ($) 
1985 government 
. a program prices 
Debt- Equity-
financing financing 
0 
300 
260 
484 
0 
10 
0 
54 
4 
0 
552 
42 
8.623 
71.687 
12.0 
158 
-13 .165 
4 
300 
780 
80 
0 
10 
0 
54 
4 
0 
148 
42 
25.869 
215.062 
12.0 
474 
-1.185 
1985 free market prices 
Debt- Equity-
financing financing 
0 
300 
130 
328 
325 
31 
0 
162 
12 
62 
920 
125 
5.466 
35.844 
15.3 
79 
-26.500 
0 
300 
130 
328 
325 
31 
0 
162 
12 
62 
920 
125 
5.466 
35.844 
15.3 
79 
-26.500 
1980 free market prices 
(in 1985 dollars) 
Debt- Equity-
financing financing 
0 
300 
260 
0 
0 
10 
722 
54 
4 
0 
790 
42 
8.623 
71.687 
12.0 
158 
19.835 
2 
300 
520 
0 
0 
10 
462 
54 
4 
0 
530 
42 
17.246 
143 .37 5 
12.0 
316 
21.000 
aThe government grain commodity program acreage set-asides associated with the corn. wheat. and oats in the baseline 
solutions for the debt- and equity-financing situations are 238 and 122. respectively. 
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Table 3. Baseline solutions. 1985 government program. 1985 free market. and 1980 free market crop prices; Cam-~al 
bluffs representative farma. 
Resource acquisition 
New center pivot systems purchased 
Dryland rented (acres) 
Irrisated Eroduction (acres) 
Corn grain 
Dryland Eroduction (acres) 
Spring wheat 
Corn grain 
Oats 
Barley 
Alfalfa 
Corn silage 
Sorghum-sudan pasture 
Total 
Cow-calf beef Eroduction and associated 
calf winterins (brood cows) 
Electric Eower used for irrisation 
Total cost ($) 
Total kWh 
Average cost per kWh (cents) 
Irrisation water used (acre-feet) 
Return to OEerator labor and 
management ($) 
1985 goveri;unen5 
program prices 
0 
300 
130 
525 
0 
23 
0 
121 
9 
0 
678 
94 
18.568 
130.108 
14.3 
79 
-54. 980 
1985 free market prices 
0 
300 
0 
303 
480 
31 
0 
162 
12 
62 
1.050 
125 
7. 739 
0 
n/a 
0 
-63.420 
1980 free market prices 
(in 1985 dollars) 
0 
300 
130 
0 
0 
23 
767 
121 
9 
0 
920 
94 
18.568 
130.108 
14.3 
79 
-22.465 
aFor each crop price situation. the debt-financing baseline solution is identical to the equity-financing baseline 
solution. 
bThe government grain commodity program acreage set-aside associated with the corn. wheat. and oats in the baseline 
solution is 242. 
operated in the six different situations examined for the low-lands farm. 
For the bluffs farm. on the other hand. one existing center pivot system is 
ief t idle in all six most profitable farm plans. and the other existing cen-
ter pivot system is operated in only four of the six situations examined. 
Even so. in five of the six comparable farming situations. the total payment 
for irrigation pumping energy is more on the bluffs farm than on the low-
lands farm. This outcome reflects the 3.5 times greater energy requirement 
per acre-foot of water pumped that is associated with the greater water lift 
(300 ft versus 150 ft) for the bluffs farm compared to the low-lands farm. 
With the 1985 government program and 1980 free market prices. the beef 
cow-calf and associated calf wintering activities are larger on the bl uffs 
than on the low-lands farm (94 versus 42 brood cows). Even so. the returns 
to operator labor and management for comparable situations on the bluffs farm 
are between $37.000 and $50.000 less than for the low-lands farm. These 
profit differentials arise from (1) the $24.000 larger annual cost associated 
with the two existing center pivots on the bluffs farm and (2) the need for 
the bluffs irrigators to pay monthly minimum charges on their two existing 
center pivots. while being unable to reap the benefits of irrigated (versus 
dryland) production that their low-lands counterparts do. 
Debt- versus equity-capital for purchasing nev irrigation equipaent 
Eor all three crop price situations for the bluffs farm and for the 1985 
free · market price situation for the low-lands farm. the debt-financing 
baseline solutions are identical to the respective equity-financing baseline 
solutions. With the 1985 government program and 1980 free market crop 
prices. on the other hand. the solutions for the low-lands farm with the 
equity-financed new irrigation equipment are substantially different from 
those with debt-financed irrigation equipment. 
The point of greatest difference concerns the purchase of new center 
pivot · systems. The annualized costs of debt-financed center pivots are high 
enough to make unprofitable the investment in new irrigation systems. With 
the relatively lower annualized costs of equity-financed center pivots. 
however. the equity-financing irrigator finds it profitable to invest in 
either two or four new center pivot systems. As a result. the equity-
financing irrigator uses 2.0 to 3.0 times as much electric power to energize 
his irrigation pumps as his debt-financing counterpart. Finally. the return 
to labor and management for the debt-financing irrigator is between $1.200 
and $12.000 less than for the equity-financing irrigator. 
Different far•: crop price situations 
As indicated above. the 1985 free market crop prices are 17% less (corn 
grain) to 24% less (spring wheat) than the 1985 government program prices. 
These price differences have major influences on · the extensiveness of irriga-
tion. the enterprise mix. and the return to irrigator labor and management in 
the optimal solutions. 
For example. with the lower 1985 free market crop prices. (1) the bluffs 
irrigators can no longer afford to ·operate either existing center pivot sys-
tem. (2) the debt-financing low-lands irrigator idles one of his two existing 
center pivots. and (3) the equity-financing low-lands irrigator cuts back 
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from six to two center pivots. Coupled with this reduction in irrigation is 
a reduction in the wheat acreage for three of the four comparable pairs of 
solutions. The enterprises which expand, on the other hand, are dryland 
corn, beef, · and the oats and forages (alfalfa, sorghum-sudan pasture, and 
corn silage) associated with the beef enterprise. Finally, with the lower 
1985 free market prices, the reductions in irrigator profits range from about 
$8 0400 to $25,300. 
The inflation-adjusted 1980 crop prices, except for spring wheat, are 
higher than the 1985 government program prices. The difference is the 
greatest for barley · (22% higher in 1980). By far the dominant change with 
1980 crop prices in farm enterprises is · the substitution of barley for wheat. 
Also, in one of the four comparable solutions, two fewer center pivots with 
corn are economic with the 1980 crop prices. Associated with the higher 1980 
crop prices are increases in the return to labor and management ranging from 
$22.200 to $32,500 per irrigator. 
UNUSUALLY HEAVY OR LIGHT VERSUS NORMAL PRECIPITATION 
In the part of the analysis described now. the impacts on the baseline 
solutions of unexpected precipitation during the irrigation season are ex-
amined. The irrigators are assumed to have (1) based their farm plans on 
normal precipitation, (2) planted their crops in the spring, and (3) followed 
fertilization, . plant protection, and other cultural practices in accordance 
with expected yields based on normal precipitation. As the crop season un-
folds, however, precipitation is assumed to depart from the normal and to be 
either unusually heavy (reaching a level experienced during only 3 to 10 
years out of 1go years) or unusually light (again, a 3 to 10 out of a 100 
year occurrence). This is presumed to result in reduced (increased) irriga-
tion requirements for irrigated crops and higher (lower) yields for dryland 
crops. 
For each representative farm with 1985 commodity prices and for both the 
debt-· and equity-financed new irrigation equipment situations, the impacts of 
unusual precipitation on the amount of irrigation water pumped, the amount of 
electricity used for pumping irrigation water, the irrigation power revenues 
received by RECs, and the return to operator labor and management were deter-
mined (Figures 1 and 2). The middle histogram-bars in the panels comprising 
the two· figures reflect outcomes with normal precipitation; these are termed 
100%-level outcomes. The left histogram-bars reflect outcomes with unusually 
heavy precipitation, · and the right bars outcomes with unusually light 
precipitation. The percentages shown at the top of the bars indicate un-
usually heavy and light precipitation outcome values relative to the respec-
tive normal precipitation values. 
With unusually heavy precipitation, the acre-feet of irrigation water 
pumped and the kWh of electricity for pumping irrigation water in each farm-
ing situation both decrease by 30%. Because of the "fixed" up-front electric 
rate charges, payments for electrical pumping energy -decrease by only 8% to 
6This reflects the one to three year cut-off points for unusually heavy and 
light precipitation that were identified relative to the 30-34 years of 
available precipitation data for the reference point weather stations in the 
study. 
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Figure l. Impacts of unusual precipitation, baseline solutions with 1985 
government program crop prices, irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed 
new irrigation equipment, Cam-Wal REC low-lands representative farm. 
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new irrigation equipment, Cam-Wal REC bluffs representative farm. 
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10% ($830 to $2.500 per irrigator). Irrigator profits with unusually heavy 
precipitation are much greater than with normal precipitation. with the in-
crease ranging from $12.600 to $37.200 per irrigator. These differences in 
profits arise . primarily from differences in the dryland acreages in the 
baseline solutions. 
With unusually light precipitation. opposite and somewhat smaller im-
pacts · on irrigation water and electric power usage and REC revenues are real-
ized. This outcome arises because the unusually light seasonal precipitation 
is only 4.5 inches less than normal. whereas the unusually heavy seasonal 
precipitation is 6.2 inches more than normal. 
The impacts on irrigator profits of unusually light precipitation are 
$720 to $10.200 greater. however. than are the impacts of unusually heavy 
precipitation. This outcome is directly associated with the assumed nature 
of the underlying · production function for irrigated corn. The yield response 
per acre-inch of irrigation water with unusually li~ht pecipitation is enough 
greater than with unusually heavy precipitation --to more than counter-
balance the smaller precipitation differential with unusually light 
precipi ta ti on. 
The impacts of unusual precipitation on irrigator profits originate f r om 
four · sources. as shown in Tables 4 and 5. The main finding from this 
analysis is that the change in electric power payments for irrigation as-
sociated with unusual precipitation is relatively small. The dominant i n-
fluence on irrigator profits is that which arisgs from the impact of unusual 
precipitation on changes in dryland crop yields. To illustrate. the changes 
in dryland crop production values are 4 to 57 times greater than the changes 
in the electric power payments for irrigation. 
These findings confirm the expectation that the short-term impacts of 
unusual precipitation on RECs are the opposite of those on irrigators. If 
the negative impacts on irrigators from drought are great enough to force 
them out of business. however. both the irrigators and their servicing RECs 
stand to lose. Thus. a rate structure that provides for the sharing of risks 
between RECs and irrigators under circumstances of unusual precipita-
tion can be expected to be in the best long-term economic interests of both 
irrigators and RECs. 
Two features of the current Cam-Wal REC electric rate structure for ir-
rigation provide for the sharing of risks between irrigators and RECs during 
seasons of unusual precipitation. The spreading of the "fixed" up-front 
7
rn terms of a "textbook" soil moisture-yield production function. the 
yield response · involves ·movement from the "normal" soil moisture-yield point 
along the production function (1) with heavy precipitation toward the 
function's maximum versus (2) with light precipitation toward the function's 
inflection point. The slope of the production function toward its maximum 
is. of course. shallower than toward its inflection point. 
8since crop irrigation requirments were adjusted in accordance with the 
"amounts of unusually heavy and light precipitation. irrigated crop yields 
were assumed to be constant across the three precipitation levels considered 
in the study. 
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Table 4. Sources of impact of unusual precipitation on irrigator profits. baseline solutions with 1985 
government program crop prices. debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment. Cam-Wal 
REC low-lands representative farm. 
Source of change in profits 
Irrigators with debt-financed 
new irrigation equipment 
Dryland crop 
production value 
Irrigation system 
repair and maintenance 
Electric power 
payment for irrigation 
Grain storage and 
drying 
Total 
Irrigators with equity-financed 
new irrigation equipment 
Dryland crop 
production value 
Irrigation system 
repair and maintenance 
Electric power 
payment for irrigation 
Grain storage and 
drying 
Total 
Change in return to irrigator 
labor and management 
associated with unusually 
_heavy precipitation 
Ratio to electric 
a Dollars power payment change 
I +28.238 I I 33.91 
+ 357 0.4 
I + 834 I 1.0 
- 1 1 550 ~ 
+27 .879 33.4 
+ 9.735 3.9 
+ 1.07 2 0.4 
+ 2.502 1.0 
661 ~ 
+12.648 5.1 
Change in return to irrigator 
labor and management 
associated with unusually 
light precipitation 
Ratio to electric 
a Dollars power payment change 
-38.691 
- 292 
- 683 
+ 1 1 826 
-37.840 
-10.936 
- 877 
- 2.048 
- 493 
-13.368 
56.7 
0.4 
1.0 
__Ek 
55.4 
5.3 
0.4 
1.0 
~ 
6.5 
aThese are the ratios of the changes in profits for the respective sources of 
in the electric power payment for irrigation. e.g •• 28.238 ~ 834 ~ 33.9 (see 
profit change to the change 
the encircled data in the 
table). 
• 
N 
~ 
Table 5. Sources of impact of unusual precipitation on irrigator profits, baseline solutions with 1985 
government program crop prices, irrigators with debt- and equity-financed new irrigation 
equipment, Cam-Wal REC bluffs representative farm. 
Source of change in profits 
Dryland crop 
production value 
Irrigation system 
repair and maintenance 
Electric power 
Grain storage and 
drying 
Total 
Change in return to irrigator 
labor and management 
associated with unusually 
heavy precipitation 
Ratio to electric 
a Dollars power payment change 
I +37 .61T] 
+ 293 
I+ 1,473 I 
- 2,243 
+37,194 
I 2s.6J 
0.2 
1.0 
n/a 
25.3 
Change in return to irrigator 
labor and management 
associated with unusually 
light precipitation 
Ratio to electric 
a Dollars power payment change 
-48,242 40.0 
- 239 0.2 
- 1,205 1.0 
+ 2,248 n/a 
-47 ,43 8 39.4 
aThese are the ratios of the changes in profits for the respective profit-sources to the change in the 
electric power payment for irrigation, e.g., 37,671 + 1,473 = 25.6 (see the encircled data in the 
table). 
.. 
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costs over fewer kWhs results in higher average costs per kWh in years of 
unusually heavy precipitation (and hence limited irrigation pumping). The 
three-stepped declining energy (kWh) block rate also results in higher 
average variable energy (kWh) costs with heavy precipitation. Conversely. 
when precipitation during an irrigation season is unusually light. both fea-
tures contribute to a below normal overall average cost per kWh for the 
electric power used by an irrigator. 
THE ESTIMATED DEMANDS FOR ELECTRIC POWER AND WATER FOR IRRIGATION 
In this section. the impacts of different prices per kWh of electricity 
on the quantities of electricity used to pump irrigation water and the quan-
tities of irrigation water pumped are presented. For each representative 
farm situation examined. a series of optimal solutions was determined. The 
basic reference point for pricing electricity in the models is the 1985 
electric rate structure for the REC. To simplify the interpretation of the 
results of analysis. however. a single- rather than three-step kWh energy 
charge is used. 
In each of the six situations examined for each representative farm. 
starting with a price of 1 cent per kWh. the price of electricity was raised 
successively by 1 cent per kWh increments--with all other prices and tech-
nological coefficients held constant--until the use of electric power to pump 
irrigation water just became uneconomic. Changes in both the quantities of 
electric power used for pumping irrigation water and quantities of irrigation 
water pumped were determined. Figures 3 and 4 show the price-quantity 
relationships for electric power· and Fig~res 5 and 6 the price-quantity 
relationships for pumped irrigation water. In economic terms. the first 
series of functional relationships is termed the estimated "direct price 
demand functions for electricity" and the second is termed the estimated 
"cross price demand functions for irrigation water". 
These demand functions are stepped. as is characteristic of any derived 
demand function estimated with a linear programming model. The dotted por-
tions in the functions represent non-empirically estimated segments between 
the respective pairs of one cent energy charges for which the empirical es-
timations were made. 
Because the kWh prices are specified in the model runs in integer values 
and the irrigation crop production activities are specified in 130 acre 
units. many of the steps and vertical segments in the estimated demand func-
tions for the individual irrigated farms are rather long. The steps between 
the respective pairs of kWh energy costs reflect changes in the numbers of 
irrigation systems in the most profitable representative farm solutions. 
The real-world aggregate demand functions for all irrigators served by 
any one REC are much smoother (i.e •• more continuous) than the functions 
reported in Figures 3-6. They are smoother because the economic behavior of 
every irrigator is not identical and because some irrigators have non-130 
acre center pivot fields. Nevertheless. a common practice in applied 
9The figures are presented on pp. 27, 28, 30, and 31, i mmediately after the 
points in the text at which the empirical findings portrayed in them are 
first discussed. 
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economic analysis is to assume that the general shape of demand functions 
estimated from the analysis of "typical" individual farms is a reasonable 
proxy for the general shape of the aggregate demand functions for the real-
world situation_ being examined. 
Six derived demand functions, rather than one, were estimated for each 
representative farm. This approach enables the reflection of a variety of 
different circumstances · that either apply in fact or could conceivably apply 
to different irrigators served by the REC at one or more points in time. 
These different circumstances are now briefly noted, along with the pairs of 
analogous panels in the figures that are compared in drawing conclusions con-
cerning the respective sets of circumstances: 
i. Irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed nev irrigation equip-
ment: Panels a versus b and Panels c versus d; 
ii. 1985 governaent prograa versus 1985 free 
reflect the · impact of farmer non-participation · in the 
commodity program on the demands for electric power 
Panels a versus c and Panels b versus d, and 
market prices, to 
1985 government grain 
and irrigation water: 
iii. With versus without aonthly ainiaua and aonthly deaand charges. 
to reflect· the impact of a possible structural change in the electric rate 
structure in which the "fixed" up-front charges would be eliminated and 
electricity payments would -be exelusively via an energy (kWh) charge: Panels 
a versus e and Panels c versus f. 
Estimated direct price deaand functions for electricity to puap irrigation 
water 
In describing the demand functions in Figures 3 and 4, emphasis is given 
to (1) the "endpoints" of the functions, i". e •• the amounts of electric power 
used (a) when electricity is priced at 1 cent per kWh and (b) when the price 
of electricity is just high enough that pumping irrigation water with 
electric power becomes uneconomic, and (2) the direct price elasticities of 
demand for electricity to pump irrigation water. The direct price elas-
ticities of demand reflect percentage changes in the quantity of electricity 
used as ratios to corresponding percentage changes in the price of 
electricity. Because of the discrete nature of the functions, "arc elas-
ticities" were calculated over specified segments of the demand functions. 
The pertinent price ranges and estimated elasticities for each demand func-
tion are shown in the inset for each panel in the two figures. 
Also noted in the insets are the average "variable" energy charges per 
kWh (termed "B/L kWh costs") in the respective baseline solutions that are 
analogous to the kWh· costs reflected in the respective estimated demand func-
tions. In the panels (e and £) which involve "without" monthly minimum 
(MM) and monthly demand (MD) charges, the MM and MD charges in the baseline 
solutions are allocated across kWhs--in addition to·the nominal energy (kWh) 
charges. By noting the "location" of these average "B/L kWh costs" on the 
respective demand functions, one can envision the expected type of response 
by irrigators to possible changes from the 1985 levels for the kWh energy 
charge. 
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~otes : l. In the above panel tit l es, (a ) MM• monthly min i mum and MD• monthly demand 
at t he 1985 baseline races and (b) "debt-financing" and "equity-financing" 
mean irrigators who finance new irr i gation equipment with debt- and equic y-
·capital, respectively. 
2 . The "price range" and " Ep" i nsets show the "direct price elast i cit i es 
of demand for electricity to pump i rrigation water" ( Ep) for various kWh 
energy charges (c per kWh). The "B/L kWh cost" is the average var i able 
energy cost per kWh i n the respective baseline solutions chat is analagous 
to the kWh cost reflected in the respective estimated demand functions. 
Figure 3. Estimated direct price demand functions for ele~tric i ty to pump irr i gation 
water, Cam-Wal REC l ow-lands re~resen tat ive fan:i. 
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Notes: 1. In the above p~nel titles, (a) MM= monthly minimum and MD s monthly demand 
at the 1985 baseline races and (b) "debt-financing" and "equity-financing" 
mean irrigators who finance new irrigation equipment with debt- and equit y-
capital, respectively. 
2. The "price range" and "Ep" insets .rhow the "direct price elasticities 
of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water" (Ep) for various kWh 
energy charges (C per kWh). The "B/L kWh cost" is the average variable 
energy cost· per kWh in the respective baseline solutions that is analagous 
to the kWh cost reflected in the respective estimated demand functions. 
Figure 4. Estimated direct price demand functions for electricity to pump irrigation 
water, Cam-Wal REC bluffs representative farm. 
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Eight of the estimated demand functions have only one step. Three 
pertain to the low-lands farm, and five to the bluffs farm. In each such in-
stance, only one electrically powered center pivot system is operated over 
lower ranges of . kWh prices (with the upper price in these ranges varying from 
3 to 26 cents). The other four demand functions have from two to five steps, 
with between two and six center pivots being operated at the lower kWh 
prices. 
The direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pwnp irriga-
tion ·water for the single-step functions are from -1.08 to -1.67. The elas-
ticities for the multi-step functions range from being quite inelastic (as 
small as -0.38) at "low" electricity prices to being very elastic (between 
-3 .00 and -11.00) at '·'high" electricity prices. These elasticity differences 
have important implications in the consideration of rate policies by RECs. 
If rates are increased over price ranges involving inelastic demand, total 
electric power revenues can be expected to increase. Conversely, if rates 
are increased over price ranges involving elastic demand, total electric 
power revenues can be expected to decline. 
The four estimated demand functions intended to portray most directly 
the various conditions of different irrigators served in 1985 by the Cam-Wal 
REC are presented in Panels a through din Figures 3 and 4. · A review of · 
the baseline average variable energy costs per kWh in relation to these 
demand func·tions shows that: 
Energy prices for the low-lands debt-financing irrigator could rise 
between 10 and 13 cents per kWh from the 1985 level before the amount of 
electric energy to energize irrigation pwnps wol:lld begin to decrease, and at 
18 cents per kWh irrigators would shift entirely from electric to diesel 
power; 
Energy prices for the low-lands equity-financing irrigator under both 
1985 government program and 1985 free market crop prices and for the bluffs 
irrigator with 1985 government program crop prices would have to rise only to 
8 cents per kWh ·before farmers would totally stop using electric power for 
irrigation; and 
- Energy prices for bluffs irrigators with 1985 free market prices would 
have to drop to 3 cents per kWh before they would find it profitable to 
operate one of their existing center pivot systems, and that with a price 
even as low as 1 cent per kWh they would not find it to be profitable to 
operate the second existing center pivot unit. 
The contrasts between the baseline solutions for the low-lands and the 
bluffs representative farms are generally reflected in the demand analysis as 
well. In only one situation (namely, debt-financing, 1985 government program 
prices, · without MM and MD charges), for example, does · the bluffs irrigator 
operate both of his existing center pivot units at "low" electricity prices. 
On the other hand, in two situations the low-lands irrigator operates six 
center pivots, and in a third situation be operates two center pivots. In 
five of the six comparable situations, the kWh price at which electric power 
irrigation systems are no longer economic is considerably higher for the low-
lands than the bluffs farm. This price differential is as great as 18 cents 
per kWh. 
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No one pattern characterizes the impacts of leveraged newly purchased 
irrigation systems on the demand for electrical pumping energy. For the 
bluffs farm, no impact is shown in either pair of comparable situations. For 
the low-lands farm, on the other hand, the leveraged irrigator continues· to 
pump with electrical energy at much higher kWh prices ( 10 cents) than his 
equity-financing counterpart. In the lower range of kWh prices, however, the 
use of equity capital facilitates a much greater investment in center pivot 
systems with 1985 government program prices, and no difference in investment 
with 1985 free market prices. 
Consistent with simple micro-economic production theory, the derived 
demand function for electrical pumping energy is shifted farther from the 
origin with the relatively higher government program than free market prices 
in all four comparable situations. On the low-lands farm, however, the out-
ward shift is limited to the lower kWh price range. For the bluffs farm, on 
the other hand, the outward shift is limited to the higher kWh price range. 
Finally. the derived demand functions that involve the elimination of 
the 1985 monthly minimum and monthly demand charges are also shifted far t her 
from the origin than their 1985 baseline counterparts. The outward shift 
takes place over the entire · span of the demand functions for the debt-
financing irrigator with 1985 government program prices, but only over the 
upper kWh price range with 1985 free market prices. In no case does the de-
gree _of · vertical displacement ·of the demand function conform at all closely 
to the per kWh· cost equivalent of the monthly minimum and monthly demand 
charges. Thus; the structural change in the electric rate charges does in-
duce structural changes in the demand for electrical pumping energy, but the 
induced charges show no common pattern. 
Estiaated cross price demand functions for irrigation water 
For the bluffs farm, the shapes of the estimated cross price demand 
functions for irrigation water are identical to those for the direct price 
demand functions (Figure 6). This outcome reflects the fact that diesel sys-
tems never become economic on the bluffs farm. 
For all six low-lands farm situations, however, diesel systems do become 
econo~ic (Figure 5). This circumstance arises in five of the six situations 
when high eiectric prices cause the last electric powered center pivot system 
to become uneconomic. At that point, the electrically powered center pivot 
is converted to diesel power. 
In the sixth situation, with 1985 government program crop prices and 
electricity at 7 cents per kWh, two new diesel systems are purchased. At 8 
cents per kWh, two new diesel systems are purchased, and the two originally-
present electric systems are converted to diesel power. 
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Fi gure 5. Est imated cross price demand functions for i rr i gation water, Cam-Wal REC 
low-lands representative far111 . 
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bl uf fs representative fa rm . 
32 
RATE STRU Cl'URE ANALYSIS 
In the prior demand analysis, greater attention is given to changes in 
the rate level than to the rate structure for electricity. In this section, 
relatively more explicit attention is given to rate structures. The impacts 
on irrigators and the REC of different levels of up-front (monthly minimum 
and monthly demand) and energy charges and differently configured energy 
(kWh) block rates are each examined. 
Different levels of •fixed• up-front and variable energy electric rate 
charges 
Rural electric cooperatives are faced with high fixed costs. These 
costs derive from (1) substantial investments by RECs in electric power 
transmission and physical plant facilities and (2) wholesale power demand 
charges paid by RECs to offset the high fixed cost of coal-based electric 
generation facilities. In this study's baseline solutions, for example, the 
"fixed" up-front monthly minimum and monthly demand charges account for 68% 
to 75% ·of the irrigators' total electric power payments for irrigation (Table 
6) • 
In years of unusually great precipitation and/or widespread participa-
tion of irrigators in acreage set-aside government commodity programs, ir-
rigation pumping may . decline greatly. To . guard against electric power 
revenue shortfalls in such circumstances, most RECs adopt electric pricing 
policies that result in the passing on of their "fixed" costs to their cus-
tomers in the form of "fixed" up-front electric rate charges. 
Some irrigators object to having to make large up-front payments for 
their· electrically powered irrigation systems. They would prefer that a 
larger proportion of their irrigation electric power payments be in the form 
of energy (kWh) charges. They place particular value on being able to 
exercise direct· control over their irrigation power bills by determining when 
and for how long they run their systems. Further, some irrigators believe 
that many of the REC fixed cost facilities are already paid off and, there-
fore, .t~at they sh~8ld not have to continue to bear large up-front 
electricity payments. 
In practice, many of an REC's capital assets are depreciated over as 
many as 10 to 30 years. Even after these depreciation periods are exhausted, 
the capital assets usually have to be replaced, which sets in motion new 
series of even higher dollar rates of depreciation (because of inflation) for 
the RECs. 
Although large proportions of REC operating costs are "fixed" and the 
fixed - costs do not generally diminish over time, the impacts of pricing 
electricity through varying proportions of up-front and variable energy (kWh) 
charges are examined. The rationale for undertaking this analysis is partly 
scientific curiosity and · partly to generate information that could be used in 
responding to the concerns of irrigators who would strongly prefer to pay for 
lOThe periods specified in contracts between irrigators and RECs are 
generally much shorter than the average length of time over which an REC's 
various capital assets are depreciated. 
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Table 6. "Fixed" up-front versus variable energy charges; ba.seline solutions; 1985 government 
program. 1985 free market. and 1980 free market crop prices; irrigators with debt- versus 
equity-financed new irrigation equipment; Cam Wal REC low-lands and bluffs representative 
farms. 
Low-lands farm Bluffs farm: debt- and 
Debt-financing Eg ui ty- financing eg ui ty- financing 
Dollars Percent Dollars Percent Dollars Percent 
Solutions with 1985 government 
commoditr Erogram Erices 
Monthly minimum charges 924 10. 7 2.772 10.7 5.417 29.2 
Monthly demand charges 4.933 57.2 14. 799 57.2 8.263 44.5 
Sub-total of up-front charges (5.857) ( 67.9) (17 .571) ( 67.9) (13 .680) ( 73. 7) 
Energy charges 
.2.Zf!f! _llJ 8.228 32.1 4.888 26.3 
Total electric power charges 8.623 100.0 25.869 100.0 18.568 100.0 
Solutions with 1985 free market 
Erices 
Monthly minimum charges 1.617 29.6 1.617 29.6 7.739 100.0 
Monthly demand charges 2.466 45.1 2.466 45.1 0 0 
Sub-total of up-front charges (4,083) ( 74.7) ( 4,083) ( 7 4. 7) ( 7.739) (100.0) 
Energy charges 1.383 25.3 1.383 25.3 0 __ o
Total electric power charges 5.466 100.0 5.466 100.0 7.739 100.0 
Solutions with 1980 free market 
Er ices 
Monthly minimum charges 924 10. 7 1.848 10. 7 5.417 29.2 
Monthly demand charges 4.933 57.2 9.866 57.2 8.263 44.5 
Sub-total of up-front charges (5.857) ( 67.9) (11,714) (67.9) (13.680) ( 73. 7) 
Energy charges 2. 766 32.1 5 1 532 32.1 4.888 --1Ll 
Total electric power charges 8.623 100.0 17.246 100.0 18.568 100.0 
• 
electric power via rate structures with a higher proportion of total costs 
included in the kWh charges. 
In exploring this issue, the impacts of both increasing and decreasing 
one-at-a-time each of the monthly minimtun, monthly demand, and energy charges 
are determined. All other prices (including only 1985 government program 
crop prices) and · the technological coefficients are held constant in 
analysis. The "increased" electric rates are arbitrarily set at double their 
respective · 1985 baseline -levels. The "decreased" electric rates are set at 
25% of their·baseline levels (i.e . , at 75% less than their respective 1985 
baseline levels). Normal precipitation is asstuned. Optimal solutions for 
each of the representative farms are determined with each of these alternate 
electric rate structures. 
The results of this analysis for the low-lands and bluffs representative 
farms · are presented in Figures 7 and 8. The histogram-bars that reflect 
results from the baseline solutions with 1985 electric power rates are 
described as showing 100%-level outcomes. The · three histogram-bars to the 
left of the center baseline bars reflect outcomes for the respective one-at-
a-time doubling in price for the three electric rate components, and the bars 
to the right of center reflect outcomes for the 75% reduced electric rate 
charges. 
For three of the six modified electric rate pricing situations, irriga-
tion · pumping and electric power usage are unaffected: a doubling of the 
monthly minimum and a 75% reduction of either the monthly 
minimum or energy charge. In three of the four cases involving a doubling of 
the monthly demand or energy charge, on the other hand, irrigation pumping 
and electric power usage are negatively impacted. For the bluffs farm, the 
negative impact involves the total elimination of electrically energized ir-
rigation pumps. Finally. with a 75% reduction in the monthly demand charge 
for both equipment financing situations on both the low-lands and bluffs 
farms, pumping and electric power use double (reflecting the operation of one 
additional center pivot). 
A one-at-a-time doubling of the individual electric rate charges results 
in as many instances of decreased as increased REC irrigation power revenue. 
The increases range from 11% to 57% of the respective baseline values. Five 
of the six decreases are to 41% to 44% of the respective baseline values. 
One-at-a-time reductions in the elect~ic rate charges, on the other hand, 
lead to an almost consistent pattern (only one exception) of reduced 
REC irrigation power revenues. The reductions are as much as 57% of the 
respective baseline levels. 
The returns to irrigator labor and management are without exception 
negatively impacted by a doubling of the individual electric rate charges. 
The decreases in returns relative to the ·respective baseline values, range 
from about $1,000 to $10,000 for the low-lands farm and from about $5,500 to 
$6,500 for the bluffs farm. With one-at-a-time reductions in the electric 
rate charges, an opposite type·of outcome prevails. The extent of increase 
in irrigator profits with ~ 75% reduction in each electric rate charge ranges 
on the low-lands farm from $600 to $11,000 and on the bluffs farm from $4,000 
to $8,500. 
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Figure 7. Impacts of one-at-a-time increased and decreased monthly minimum, monthly 
demand, and energy electric rate charges, irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed 
new i rrigation equipment, 1985 government program prices, Cam-Wal REC low-lands 
representative farm. 
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The final focus of analysis in this section is on a very practical 
consideration to REC management. What if the Cam-Wal REC were to decrease 
its monthly minimum or monthly demand charges and then unusually heavy 
precipitation were to be experienced? To what extent would REC revenues be-
come vulnerable from such a policy decision on rates and such a natural 
circumstance? 
To investigate this question, differences in REC revenues (and irrigator 
profits) in circumstances with normal versus unusually heavy precipitation--
under assumed one-at-a-time 75% reductions in monthly minimum and monthly 
demand caarges--are examined. The normal precipitation circumstances are 
those just described. The budgeting of the impacts of unusually heavy 
precipitation is based on the assumptions and procedures used for examining 
this phenomenon in the section entitled "unusually heavy or light versus nor-
mal precipitation." 
The findings from this analysis for the two representative farms are 
presented in Table 7. If RECs were to reduce either of their up-front 
electric rate · charges by -75% and their irrigator clients were then to ex-
perience unusually heavy precipitation, the irrigation generated revenues 
would be reduced by $835 to $2,945 per irrigator. These reductions amount to 
10% to 17% of the · respective REC revenues with normal precipitation. 
Simultaneously, irrigators would realize added profits ranging from $12,650 
to $37,150. 
Because RECs are not permitted by federal law to carry forward positive 
margins from one year to another, even a 10% to 17% unexpected reduction in 
REC revenue in a particular year would somehow have to be covered in that 
same year. If the REC revenue shortfall occurred as a result of unusually 
heavy precipitation, irrigators with dryland would derive substantial 
economic benefits from the added precipitation. In principle, an after-
season rate adjustment mechanism could be created to transfer enough of that 
precipitation benefit to the REC to meet its fixed cost obligations--in ex-
change for a concession by the REC to irrigators for part of the burden of 
the electric payment for irrigation to be shifted from up-front to variable 
energy charges. From three standpoints, however, such a pricing policy would 
probably be ill-advised. 
1. The more complex a rate pricing policy, the greater the difficulties 
in administering the policy. Administrative encumberances could be expected 
to arise in (a) ensuring that all irrigators would know about and clearly un-
derstand the after-season rate adjustment provision, (b) arriving at a common 
agreement between individual irrigators and the REC on whether (and, if so, 
how much) precipitation during the irrigation season is "unusually great", 
and (c) collecting the additional electric payments after the irrigation 
pumping season ends. In addition, special pricing features for one electri c 
rate class (electric power consuming sector) not shared by other rate classes 
can be expected to lead to possible customer discontent and misunderstanding. 
2. Such a rate adjustment policy would do nothing to compensate for REC 
revenue ~hortfalls that could arise from non-precipitation based reductions 
in irrigation pumping, e.g., from acreage set-aside government commodity 
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Table 7. Selected impacts of unusually heavy precipitation when monthly 
minimum and monthly demand charges are reduced one-at-a-time to 
25% of their respective levels in 1985. irrigators with 
debt-financed versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment. 
Cam-Wal REC low-lands and bluffs representative farms. 
Low-land farm Bluffs farm 
Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly 
minimum demand minimum demand 
charge charge charge charge 
Irrigators with debt-financed new 
irrigation equipment 
Impacts on REC revenues 
Dollar decrease per irrigator 835 1.670 1.47 5 2.945 
Dollar decrease as a percent of 
the revenue with normal 
precipitation 10.5 16.9 10.2 17.3 
Impacts on irrigator prof its 
Dollar increase per irrigator 27 .835 20.350 37.150 30.220 
Dollar profits with normal 
precipitation per irrigator 
-12.550 - 4.150 -50.995 -46 .545 
Irrigators with eguity-financed new 
irrigation eguipment 
Impacts on REC revenues 
Dollar decrease per irrigator 2.500 2.500 1.47 5 2.945 
Dollar decrease as a percent of 
the revenue with normal 
precipitation 10.5 16.9 10.2 17.3 
Impacts on irrigator profits 
Dollar increase per irrigator 12.650 12.650 37.150 30.220 
Dollar profits with normal 
precipitation per irrigator 1.115 10.135 -50.995 -46 .545 
programs. 
3. Perhaps most significant and as indicated above. two features of the 
current electric rate structure already provide for the sharing of risks be-
tween irrigators and RECs during seasons of unusual irrigation pumping. The 
spreading of the "fixed" up-front costs over fewer kWhs results in higher 
average costs per -kWh in years of unusually little- pumping. The three-
stepped declining energy (kWh) block rate also results in higher average 
variable kWh costs with limited irrigation pumping. Conversely. when irriga-
tion pumping during an irrigation season is unusually great. both features 
contribute to a below-normal overall average cost per kWh for the electric 
power used by an irrigator. 
Differently configured energy (kWh) charge block rates 
The 1985 Cam-Wal REC electric rate structure for irrigation provides for 
a three-step variable energy (kWh) charge--in addition to up-front monthly 
minimum and monthly demand charges. In the analysis of differently con-
figured energy (kWh) block rates. attention is given to a single-step energy 
charge. a modified three-step declining energy block rate. and a three-step 
increasing energy block rate. The up-front electric charges are specified in 
some models at 1985 levels and in others at zero levels. The primary purpose 
of this analysis is to determine if differently configured energy block 
rates. and a different policy regarding the assessment of up-front electric 
rate charges. would provide incentive for either greater or lesser electric 
power and water usage in irrigation. 
The heights of the steps. i.e •• the levels of the prices for the various 
stepsi in the alternative block rate structures were determined as follows. 11 
The alternative energy block rate prices were specified relative to the 
average energy costs per kWh in the respective baseline solutions (call them 
AC). These AC values became (1) the single-step block rate prices and 
(2) the middle-step prices in the modified three-step block rate models in 
which the up-front charges were set at the 1985 baseline levels (Table 8). 
In those model runs with zero monthly minimum and monthly demand charges. the 
AC values reflect the total electric payment for irrigation in the baseline 
solution divided by the total kWhs in the solution. To test the impact of 
more strongly graduated declining block rates. the first- and the third-step 
prices in the modified three-step declining block rate ~odels were set at 90% 
more and 90% less than the respective AC values. 12 In the three-step 
increasing block rate models. the first and third-step declining block rate 
charges are interchanged. 
11 The lengths of the steps. i.e., the numbers of kWhs covered by each 
bounded step, in the modified three-step block rate analysis are the same as 
those in the baseline models. 
12with the baseline electric rate structure. the differences between the 
first- and second-step charges and between the second- and third-step 
charges are 0.52 cents and 1.58 cents per kWh. respectively. The 
first-to-second and second-to-third step electric rate charge differentials 
in the more strongly graduate three-step models with the 1985 up-front 
charges are between 3.4 and 3.5 cents per kWh. The corresponding 
differentials with zero up-front charges are between 10.8 and 12.8 cents per 
kWh. 
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Table 8. Differently configured variable energy (kWh) block rate charges 
assumed in analysis. Cam-Wal REC low-lands and bluffs representative 
a farms. 
Level of charge {cents Ber kWhl 
Low-lands farm Bluffs farm 
First Second Third First Second Third 
Block rate model step step step step step step 
Baseline thre~gtep 
declining block 4.410 3 .890 2.310 4.410 3.890 2.310 
Singl~step 
1985 up-front charges 3 .858 n/a n/a 3. 7 57 n/a n/a 
Zero up-front charges 12.030 n/a n/a 14.270 n/a n/a 
Modified thre~step 
declining block 
1985 up-front charges 7.330 3 .858 0.386 7 .138 3. 757 0.376 
Zero up-front charges 22.856 12.030 1.203 27 .110 14.270 1.427 
Thre~step increasing block 
1985 up-front charges 0.386 3 .858 7 .330 0.376 3 .757 7 .138 
Zero-up-front charges 1.203 12.030 22.856 1.427 14.270 27 .110 
aThe block rate charges in the debt-financing models are identical to those in 
the respective equity-financing models. 
bThe baseline block rate charges reflect the basic 4.2. 3.7. and 2.2 cent per 
kWh thre~step energy charges. adjusted up by an assumed 5% interest time 
money cost. 
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The results of the alternative energy block rate analysis are presented 
in Figures 9 and 10. The first histogram-bar in each panel represents the 
base1ine solution result. The other bars represent the results for the al-
ternative block· rate models as follows: 
- Second and third bars: single-step models: 
- Fourth and fifth bars: modified three-step declining block rate 
~odels: and 
Sixth and seventh bars: three-step increasing block rate models. 
The up-front electric charges were set at the 1985 levels in the models un-
derlying the first. second. fourth. and sixth bars ·and were eliminated in the 
models underlying the third. fifth. and ~eventh bars. 
The various modified energy block rates have zero impact on irrigation 
electric power and water usage in all the low-land farm situations examined 
and in the bluffs farm models in which the 1985 up-front components are 
retained. Only for the bluffs farm with zero up-front charges. then. do the 
differently -configured energy block rates impact irrigation electric power 
and energy use. In that case--no matter whether the modified block rate in-
volves a single-step. modified declining three-step. or increasing three-step 
energy charge--it is more profitable to stop irrigating- and dryland farm 
only. 
The impacts of the differently configured energy block rate charges on 
REC irrigation power revenues correspond identically to the respective 
amounts of electricity used for pumping irrigation water in the various 
models. The impacts of the different energy block rates on the returns to 
irrigator · labor and management are relatively minor. ranging from less than 
0.5% (less than $50) to as much as a plus $1.500 for the bluffs irrigator in 
instances where the 1985 up-front electric rate charges are set at zero. 
In summary. the results from the analysis of differently configured 
energy block rates do not conform to a particular type of pattern--especially 
as might be hypothesized on the basis of simple micro production theory (all 
other things the same). For example. in only two of eight situations is 
decreased energy and/or water usage associated with increasing block rate 
charges. Further. in two of eight situations. decreased energy and water 
usage are ·unexpectedly associated with more steeply declining three-step 
block rate charges. These findings suggest that the modified block rates set 
in motion other features of farm reorganization that more than counterbalance 
what otherwise would be expected to take place based on simple economic 
theory with all else the same. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The analytic model employed in this study. as with any other study. 
fails · to accommodate all pertinent features of the real-world environment 
being studied. Those features believed to be most limiting in this regard 
are the following. · 
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Figure 9. Impacts of differently configured energy block rate charges, irrigators with 
debt- versus equit y-financed new irrigation equipment, 1985 government program prices, 
Can-Wal REC low-lands representative farm. 
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Figure 10. Impacts of differently configured energy block rate charges, irrigators 
with debt- verus equity financed new irrigation equipment, 1985 government prog=am 
prices, Cam-Wal REC bluffs representative farm. 
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The actual farmer decision-making process is only crudely incorporated 
into the linear programming model. The only farmer managerial objective ex-
plicitly considered in the model is the maximization of revenue over the 
variable costs of farm production. No attention is given to other potential-
ly quantifiable objectives (regarding. for example. cash-flow management and 
risk management) and less quantifiable objectives (e.g •• preferences regard-
ing family involvement with the farm. farmer involvement in the home. leisure 
time). Neither is attention given to the investment credit (prevailing in 
1985) and · tax deduction dimensions of irrigation investments. 
The model covers only a single production period; yet. many decisions 
are made by farmers within the context of several production periods. Crops 
are considered individually; yet. some farmers plan cropping patterns with 
rotational considerations in mind. Specific assumptions (e.g •• center pivots 
that cover only 130 acres of· land each. land and labor resource 
availabilities. insurance rates. commodity storage and marketing practices) 
may apply to some farms. but certainly not to all farms. The same is true 
for the assumed crop and livestock production coefficients and irrigation 
technologies. Because of these limitations. the findings from the study--
while based on the soundest analytic procedures that we would find and fur-
ther develop--should not be interpreted as absolutely definitive. 
We also realize that the applicability of the findings from the study to 
indiv.idual RECs depends importantly on the cost structures and governing 
philosophies of each REC. It is hoped that this report and others prepared 
through this research project will proyide some useful insights to RECs as 
they deal with the inherently multi-faceted and complex task of formulating 
electric rate pricing policies for irrigation • 
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